Folgt man Wiki, dann konzentriert sich die Kritik an der Bismarck im wesentlichen auf drei Bereiche. Zitate aus Wiki übernommen:
Problem 1: .
Preston claimed that the design was an enlarged reworking of the World War I
Bayern class battleships and retained old-fashioned features particularly in respect of the armour layout, regarded as outdated by the Royal Navy and United States Navy.
[72] Authors like Jack Brower
[73] or William H. Garzke and Robert O. Dulin have claimed this is not true in their books
The Battleship Bismarck and
Battleships: Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War II: "This . . . resulted in some speculation that the Bismarck-class battleships were mere copies of these older ships. This is false; the new ships had to be faster and have more protection, range, and firepower; and the percentages allocated to armour protection, firepower, and propulsion were not the same as Bayern. The triple-shaft arrangement and the distribution and calibre of the main armament were the only major similarities."
[74][75]
Problem 2: The low location of the main armour deck, in the same position as that in WWI ships, left the two decks above the armour deck exposed to plunging fire and bombs; British and American ships reduced the exposed area by positioning the main armour decks one deck higher.
[72] The
Bismarck class battleships were designed to fight in the North Sea and the North Atlantic. In these waters poor visibility, especially during the winter, meant relatively short ranges of engagement, typically 10-15,000 m, were expected; the emphasis was, therefore, on close-range protection.
[73] The dual armoured decks were chosen by the Kriegsmarine to guarantee that shells and bombs burst upon contact with the upper armoured deck, rather than penetrating deeper into the ship's vitals.
[76]
Problem 3: The provision of both a secondary armament of twelve 5.9-inch (150 mm) guns and the inclusion of a separate battery of sixteen 4.1-inch (100 mm) high-angle (anti-aircraft) guns was also criticised on the grounds that fitting two types of weapons required more deck space and weight than the dual-purpose secondary armaments of Allied ships, which could engage both air and surface target, required only one size of secondary ammunition, and simplified fire-control.
[78]
Wenn man noch zusätzlich die Entwicklung beim Radar berücksichtigt, dann war sie in Bezug auf die Früherkennung von Gegnern zusätzlich benachteiligt. Ein Aspekt, der sich aufgrund des Fehlens einer eigenen Marineluftwaffe zusätzlich gravierend negativ auswirkte.
Es stellt sich zudem für mich persönlich die Frage, ob die unterbrochende Entwicklung von fast 15 bis 20 Jahren zu einem latenten Know how Verlust beim Schlachtschiffbau geführt hat im Vergleich zum englischen oder amerikanischen Bau?
Zudem dürften die Versuche der Engländer am Ende des WW1 zu wertvollen Erkenntnisssen geführt haben hinsichtlich der Optimierung von passiven Sicherungskonzepten.